一、讲座主题：Collusion in the Presence of Antitrust Prosecution: Experimental Evidence

二、主讲人：李俊乾，昆士兰大学博士。研究方向为产业组织和实验经济学。

三、主要内容：We conduct an experimental study of cartel behaviour in the presence of an ac-

tive competition authority that may respond to suspicious pricing behaviour by firms. We find that subjects are doing very well in developing strategies to avoid  antitrust detection. We observe gradual price increases and staggered pricing con-forming with theory.

Surprisingly, the presence of antitrust prosecution tends to improve the internal functioning of cartels. Cartel prices and cartel stability are signicantly higher in the treatments with active cartel detection relative to the treatment where cartels are legal. We ascribe these results to the esprit de corps effect induced by cartel prosecution. Ex ante expected market prices are, however, lower with active

cartel detection strategies due to lower cartel formation rates.

 四、时间：2022年10月20日12:00-13:00

五、地点：腾讯会议377-245-124